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Executive Summary
As of the 2006-2007 school year, 19,733 students attended charter
schools in the District of Columbia, representing over a quarter of the
District’s total public school student population and one of the largest
charter school markets in the country.1 It is under such circumstances,
some suggest, that choice will spur competition, ultimately leading to
the improvement of public education. Yet, surprisingly little research
has evaluated the behavioral response of public schools in D.C. to this
source of competition. Most research to date on school choice in D.C.
and elsewhere focuses on the largely positive “participant effects”
that school choice programs have on choosers. By looking at the issue
from the ground level of one of the most choice-prevalent districts in
the United States, we seek to closely examine the causal dynamics of
“systemic effects” induced by competition from within the D.C. education
establishment. Our study consists of a series of interviews, focus groups,
and surveys along three levels: District elites, principals, and teachers.
Our research suggests a disconnect between the priorities of the
educational elites and the dilemmas haunting principals and teachers
in public schools. For years, continuous turnover in District leadership
and persistent financial troubles captured the attention of most of the
D.C. education sector. As such, it is unsurprising that our discussions
with elites focused more on these issues than on responding to charter
school competition. Though few interviewees mentioned charter school
competition directly when asked to list the major issues in DCPS over
the previous few years, the majority cited declining enrollment or the

1

National Center for Education Statistics. Common Core of Data.
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/
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need to consolidate facilities as the most pressing problems facing the
District, issues intrinsically linked to the presence of charters. Although
education experts acknowledged that DCPS needed to improve in the
wake of charter school competition in addition to facility right-sizing,
their general sentiment suggested that such a behavioral response
hinges on the motivation of individual schools, not the District as
a whole.
Unlike elites, most principals did not initially cite declining
enrollment as a chief concern, but many were highly aware of the longterm threat of school closure by the District. While acknowledging this
threat, most principals felt disempowered to make the changes that
they deemed necessary to reverse negative enrollment trends. Their
overarching concern was a lack of autonomy to hire and fire teachers,
obtain supplies, and maintain their facilities. Principals linked the
source of their frustration to the bureaucracy of the administration and,
in the case of staffing decisions, the limitations brought about by the
District’s teacher’s union contract. Without the capacity to implement
systemic change, many principals instead focused on recruitment
efforts as the next best alternative. Some cited the use of common
recruiting tools such as e-mail, flyers, open houses, newsletters, radio
ads, newspaper ads, church meetings, and other methods of advertising.
In addition to recruiting, principals also mentioned offering “extras,”
such as pre-K and International Baccalaureate (IB) programs, school
uniforms, and adult classes in parenting and English to attract and
retain new students.
Like principals, teachers expressed an understanding of the need to
maintain a good image in order to boost student enrollment, yet they did
not feel compelled to change their behavior in the classroom as a result
of competition. Specifically, when asked how district-wide changes
affected their instruction, they routinely replied that they had not
changed their approaches to teaching and many reported that they “put
on a show” when being observed to ensure that they appear to be doing
what their principals and the district tell them to do. Thus, according
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to our sample, it appears that most of the changes that schools are making
in order to attract more students have more to do with services for parents
and the image of the school than with improving the educational attainment
of students.
Our investigation suggests that market forces that might otherwise
be expected to spur a competitive response to school choice in D.C. are
watered down by a lack of commitment to a truly competitive model that
incorporates non-trivial consequences for failure. Efforts to enforce such
a competitive model are hampered by political dynamics and burdensome
regulations. District leaders preoccupied with politics, leadership problems,
and administrative headaches have left individual schools to respond to
charter school competition on their own. Meanwhile, D.C. principals are
not responding to competition from charter schools in the ways that elites
expected because they do not have the appropriate autonomy and resources to
do so. Furthermore, our study suggests that the schools most affected by the
exodus of students to charter schools continue to be mired with dysfunction.
While most people realize that something is not working in the public
school system in D.C., the response from all parties appears to be muted. One
might liken this situation to a watchdog that neglects to bark upon witnessing
a disturbance in its home. Playing on this analogy, our research suggests that
the bureaucracy endemic to the D.C. public school system serves as a muzzle
to prevent the dog from barking. Before the dog can bark, the District must
find a way to remove the muzzle.
Recent actions of Mayor Fenty and his staff, however, including school
closings, changes in funding schemes, and staff changes, indicate that the
competitive mechanisms of school choice might be enforced more strictly in
the future. If these recent plans come to fruition and spark further reforms in
line with school choice theory, further examination of the behavioral response
to charter school competition will be required to determine the extent to which
public schools react to competition. As Fenty and his staff take their first
steps, many residents of D.C. hope that the muzzled dog that has yet to bark
might begin to growl.
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The Muzzled Dog That Didn’t Bark:
Charters and the Behavioral Response of D.C. Public Schools
Much of the debate over school choice has been framed by proponents who argue that choice
will spur competition, ultimately leading to the improvement of public education. Although a
significant body of research is emerging regarding the largely positive “participant effects” that
school choice programs have had on choosers, precious little research exists on the “systemic
effects” of choice programs on entire public school systems and communities. While some
school choice studies have greatly contributed to our understanding of systemic effects, they
have mostly been large-scale econometric exercises that measure responses from a valuable, yet
distanced, vantage point. These studies have focused mainly on the relationship between the
presence of school choice competition and student achievement in both choice and traditional
public schools. While analyzing achievement through test scores is useful, such findings are
limited in that they tell us very little about the forces that may drive public schools to respond
to competition.
In light of those limitations, this study is another useful contribution to a small but important
set of studies examining the inner-workings of systemic effects of competition.1 By looking at
the issue from the ground level of one of the most choice-prevalent districts in the United States,

1

Studies of other urban district responses to school choice competition to date include: John Bohte, Kenneth
J. Meier, Robert D. Wrinkle, and J. L. Polinard. 2003. Examining the Impact of Charter Schools on Public
School Performance. Paper presented at the National Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, April 3-6, 2003; Frederick Hess. 2002. Revolution at the Margins: The Impact of Competition on Urban
School Systems. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; Teske, Paul, Mark Schneider, Jack Buckley and
Sara Clark. 2000. Does Charter School Competition Improve Traditional Public Schools? Civic Report 10
(June), Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; Frederick Hess, Robert Maranto, and Scott Milliman. 2001.
Small Districts in Big Trouble: How Four Arizona School Systems Responded to Charter Competition. Teachers
College Record 103 (6): 1102-1124; Frederick M. Hess and Patrick J. McGuinn. 2002. Muffled by the Din: The
Competitive Noneffects of the Cleveland Voucher Program. Teachers College Record 104 (4) 2002: 727-764;
Eric Rofes. 1998. How Are School Districts Responding to Charter Laws and Charter Schools? A Study of Eight
States and the District of Columbia. Berkeley, CA: Policy Analysis for California Education.
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the District of Columbia, we seek to closely examine the causal dynamics of systemic effects
from within the D.C. education establishment. Our study consists of a series of interviews,
focus groups, and surveys along three levels: District elites, principals, and teachers. A better
understanding of the viewpoints, reactions, and relationships within these three groups,
and their effect on the behavior of public schools in light of school choice competition, will
illuminate the findings of previous research on participant effects and student performance
measures. Knowledge as to how competition instigates public schools to respond, how that
response is perceived at different levels within the system, and why schools fail to respond will
assist in the design of future policies by providing insight into the specific mechanisms of a
system that has embraced choice.

What do past studies suggest about the way the introduction
of choice impacts behavior?
There are two dominant lenses through which to investigate the impact of school choice
competition: impacts on student achievement and changes in organizational behavior. Several
recent studies of the competitive effects of school choice focus on the effect of charter schools
or private schools on public school student achievement. A review of twenty-five major studies
of competitive effects conducted between 1972 and 2002 concluded that approximately onethird of the research documented a positive relationship between the level of competition and
student achievement gains, with the majority of the studies showing no statistically significant
relationship between the two.2 For example, Greene and Winters found that public schools in
Florida whose students were eligible for vouchers made gains that were 5.1 percentile points
greater on math tests than schools not forced to compete for their students.3 Other studies
of Florida’s schools by Chakrabarti, Figlio and Rouse, and West and Peterson have had similar

2

Clive R. Belfield and Henry M. Levin. 2002. The Effects of Competition on Educational Outcomes: A Review
of U.S. Evidence. Occasional Paper 35, New York: National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education,
Teachers College, Columbia University.

3

Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, “Competition Passes the Test,” Education Next, Summer 2004.
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findings.4 In Wisconsin, Hoxby found that schools in Milwaukee that were most exposed to
voucher competition increased math scores by 7.1 percentile points between 1999 and 2000
compared to 3.7 percentile points for schools not exposed to the challenge.5 Additionally,
studies conducted by Kevin Booker et al. (2005), John Bohte (2004), G.M. Holmes et al. (2003), Jay
Greene and Greg Forster (2002), and Caroline Hoxby (2001), found positive impacts of charter
schools on traditional public school student achievement.6 While proponents of choice champion
such results, not every situation in which competitive effects are anticipated has yielded
positive findings. In an evaluation of the effect of charter school competition on public school
student achievement in Michigan, Bettinger found no statistically significant gains.7 Buddin and
Zimmer came to a similar conclusion after studying charter school competition in California.8
Furthermore, a few studies have even found negative effects: Carr and Ritter concluded that
charter school competition produced small, but significant negative effects on traditional public

4

Martin West and Paul Peterson, “The Efficacy of Choice Threats Within School Accountability Systems,” Harvard
PEPG Working Paper 05-01, March 23, 2005, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/Papers/West_Peterson_
ChoiceThreats.pdf ; Rajashri Chakrabarti, “Impact of Voucher Design on Public School Performance: Evidence
from Florida and Milwaukee Voucher Programs,” http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~rchakrab/Papers/
Fl-Mil_Chakrabarti.pdf ; David N. Figlio and Cecilia Elena Rouse, “Do Accountability and Voucher Threats
Improve Low-Performing Schools?” NBER Working Paper No. 11597, http://www.ers.princeton.edu/
workingpapers/14ers.pdf

5

Caroline Minter Hoxby, “The Rising Tide,” Education Next, Winter 2001.

6

K. Booker, S. Gilpatric, T. Gronberg, & D. Jansen. 2005. The Effect of Charter Schools on Traditional Public
School Students in Texas: Are Children Who Stay Behind Left Behind? National Center for the Study of
Privatization in Education, Teachers College, Columbia University; John Bohte. 2004. Examining the Impact of
Charter Schools on Performance in Traditional Public Schools. Policy Studies Journal, 32(4), 501-520;
G. M. Holmes, J. DeSimone, & N. G. Rupp. 2003. Does School Choice Increase School Quality? National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper Series, 9863; J. P. Greene & G. Forster. 2002. Rising to the Challenge:
The Effect of School Choice on Public Schools in Milwaukee and San Antonio. Civic Bulletin 27 (October),
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; C. M. Hoxby. 2001. How School Choice Affects the Achievement of
Public School Students. Hoover Institution, Koret Task Force.

7

Eric Bettinger. 1999. The Effect of Charter Schools on Charter Students and Public Schools. New York:
National Center for Study of Privatization in Education, Teachers College, Columbia University.

8

Richard Buddin, & Ron Zimmer. 2005. Is Charter School Competition in California Improving the
Performance of Traditional Public Schools? RAND Working Paper.
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school student achievement in Ohio.9 Similarly, Bifulco and Ladd found small negative effects in
North Carolina only in reading.10
Many scholars hypothesize that such differing conclusions of competitive effects can be
explained, in part, by variations in analysis methods. Additionally, it is likely that the feasibility
of a positive response from public schools is conditional on school characteristics that lend
themselves to a competitive environment. A few past studies of school choice competition
suggest that the mere presence of charter school and private school alternatives is rarely
sufficient to incite a response from traditional public schools. In particular, Hess’ Revolution
at the Margins developed the notion that school choice may or may not have an impact on
traditional public schools at length, offering concrete reasons why competition may not bite
as much as some might expect. This study and others suggest that important factors, such as
the size of the competition and its impact on traditional public school budgets, the quality of
the competition, and the political will and ability of the traditional public schools to change all
contribute to the degree to which public schools will respond to school choice competition.
First, several studies have found that charter and private school students must comprise
a large enough market share to significantly affect public school enrollments such that those
schools associate the loss of students with financial hardship. For example, in their study of
student enrollment in Texas from 1996-2000, Bohte, et al. found that charter school enrollment
did not significantly contribute to public school enrollment trends. They attributed this result
to the small number of students enrolled in charter schools (50,000) relative to the overall
number of public school students in Texas (4.2 million).11 Another interview-based study with
District officials in Massachusetts revealed that student transfers to charter schools were offset
by a growing local population, such that the enrollment in the traditional public schools was

9

Matthew Carr & Gary Ritter. Measuring the Competitive Effect of Charter Schools on Student Achievement
in Ohio’s Traditional Public Schools. New York: National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education,
Teachers College, Columbia University.

10 Robert Bifulco & Helen F. Ladd. 2004. The Impacts of Charter Schools on Student Achievement: Evidence
from North Carolina. Sanford Institute Working Paper Series.
11 John Bohte, Kenneth J. Meier, Robert D. Wrinkle, and J. L. Polinard. 2003. Examining the Impact of Charter
Schools on Public School Performance. Paper presented at the National Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, Chicago, April 3-6, 2003.
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essentially unaffected by competition.12 In situations like these, it is hardly surprising that
studies of behavioral responses to school choice competition have found few system-wide
reforms. Yet even in a market with substantial charter and private school enrollment, the
mere presence of a sizeable market share creates little financial hardship for traditional public
schools unless the school funding structure is tied to enrollment. In separate studies, both
Rofes and Hess present data suggesting that districts that are more dependent on state funding,
which typically follows enrollment, respond more strongly to declining enrollment.13
In addition, in order for a competitive model to work, it makes sense that there would need
to be quality competition to induce a behavioral response from the traditional public schools.
As Harvard economist Caroline Hoxby noted in a recent interview, charter schools can provide
innovative and effective methods of instruction, organizational models, and extracurricular
programs that public schools may consider replicating.14 In some instances, it is possible that
school leaders might choose to model programs after choice programs even in the absence of
market pressure if they view such choice programs as effective.
A third and possibly the most important component necessary to generate a behavioral
response from public schools is the political will and ability to change. Teske and Schneider,
for example, conducted a qualitative study of five urban Districts, including D.C., and found
that superintendents who implemented District-wide reforms in response to charter school
competition were already “reform minded” regardless of the charter school climate. On the
other hand, while principals in this study reported that they “adopt more innovations at their
school in direct proportion to the competitive enrollment pressure that they feel,” many felt
that they still lacked the autonomy necessary to fully respond to charter school competition.15

12 Paul Teske, Mark Schneider, Jack Buckley, and Sara Clark. 2001. Can Charter Schools Change Traditional
Public Schools? In Charters, Vouchers, and Public Education, edited by Paul E. Peterson and David E. Campbell,
188-214. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
13 Eric Rofes. 1998. How Are School Districts Responding to Charter Laws and Charter Schools? A Study of Eight
States and the District of Columbia. Berkeley, CA: Policy Analysis for California Education; Frederick M. Hess.
2001 Hints of the Pick Axe: Competition and Public Schooling in Milwaukee. In Charters, Vouchers, and
Public Education, edited by Paul E. Peterson and David E. Campbell, 188-214. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press.
14 Caroline M, Hoxby. 2000. “The Battle Over School Choice,” PBS Democracy Project/Election 2000 Special,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/vouchers/
15 Paul Teske, Mark Schneider, Jack Buckley and Sara Clark. 2000. Does Charter School Competition Improve
Traditional Public Schools? Civic Report 10 (June), Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.
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In a second study of four Arizona school districts, Hess, et al. found that districts responded
to charter school competition by replacing not only principals, but also superintendents with
“more reform-minded” leaders.16 These studies suggest that the district leadership’s disposition
towards school choice, as well as their formal authority to implement change, greatly influence
the type and degree of behavioral response.
In locations where one or more of the aforementioned criteria have been met, several studies
have documented a range of competitive responses from school districts. Some districts
focus on reorganizing management and incentive structures to influence behavior. Teske and
Schneider, for example, noted that changes implemented by reform-minded leaders in response
to choice competition in several urban districts involved replacing large numbers of school
principals, implementing school-level accountability plans, and designing school-level per-pupil
funding schemes to penalize schools for the loss of students. Another study conducted by
Hanushek and Rivkin investigated the effect of school competition on teacher “hiring, retention,
monitoring, and other personnel practices.” Their findings suggest that Texas school districts
facing the most competition implemented strategies to hire better teachers and improve the
quality of existing teachers through increased emphasis on professional development.17 A third
study by Sack also reported that one Arizona school district increased opportunities for teacher
professional development in the wake of school choice competition.18
Additionally, several studies have found that charter school competition often encourages
“piecemeal” responses to school choice competition. Teske and Schneider’s study of D.C. and
other urban districts, for example, documented the implementation of Montessori programs,
the use of more technology in the classroom, Saturday class offerings, and the expansion of
elementary schools from Kindergarten (K) through 6th to K through 8th grades to increase
school enrollment. Similarly, Hess found in Arizona that school curricula were expanded
to include “extras” such as all-day kindergarten, foreign language programs, after-school

16 Frederick Hess, Robert Maranto, and Scott Milliman. 2001. Small Districts in Big Trouble: How Four Arizona
School Systems Responded to Charter Competition. Teachers College Record 103 (6): 1102-1124; John Bohte,
Kenneth J. Meier, Robert D. Wrinkle, and J. L. Polinard. 2003. Examining the Impact of Charter Schools
on Public School Performance. Paper presented at the National Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago, April 3-6, 2003.
17 Eric A. Hanushek and Steven G. Rivkin. 2003. Does Public School Competition Affect Teacher Quality? In The
Economics of School Choice, ed. Caroline Hoxby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
18 Joetta L. Sack. 2002. Charter Pioneers Force Public School Officials to Modify Operations. Education Week
online edition, April 24, 2002. http://www.edweek.org
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enrichment programs, art and theater programs, and programs for the gifted and talented. A
second Hess study of school choice programs in Milwaukee, WI, Cleveland, OH, and Edgewood,
TX, coupled with Bohte’s study of urban districts in Texas, found that districts commonly
undertake “aggressive public relations and advertising campaigns” to inform the community
about changes and improvements, a behavior likely borrowed from competitors.19

What type of response should we expect to see in
D.C. public schools?
If a behavioral response from D.C. public schools is conditional on the aforementioned
criteria—the amount of the market share diverted to choice and related financial burden, the
quality of the competition, and the political will and ability of a school system to change—the
casual observer might expect to see a competitive response to charter schooling. Indeed,
elements of all three components clearly exist, albeit to varying degrees.
As far as market share is concerned, D.C. charter school enrollment has exploded in recent
years and now has one of the largest charter school markets in the country. As of the 2006-2007
school year, 19,733 students attended charter schools in the District of Columbia, representing
over a quarter of the District’s total public school student population.20 In 1996, the first year
of charter school implementation, there were 78,648 students in traditional public schools.
However, by the fall of 2006 the District reported an enrollment figure of only 52,191 students
attending traditional public schools (excluding charter schools) – a decline of 33.6 percent.21
Additionally, for almost a decade, District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) has employed a
weighted student formula to fund individual schools based on their student enrollment. Thus
schools that lose students to charter schools lose the associated per-pupil funding. As a result
of declining enrollment and subsequent student funding shortages, seven D.C. Public Schools
were closed in the first two years following the passage of the Charter School Act in 1996 and

19 Frederick Hess. 2002. Revolution at the Margins: The Impact of Competition on Urban School Systems.
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; John Bohte, Kenneth J. Meier, Robert D. Wrinkle, and J. L.
Polinard. 2003. Examining the Impact of Charter Schools on Public School Performance. Paper presented at
the National Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 3-6, 2003.
20 National Center for Education Statistics. Common Core of Data. http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/
21 Percentage based on change in DCPS enrollment from 1996-2005 from 78,648 to 52,191 students. 2006
enrollment count based on audited total published by the D.C. Public Charter School Board: http://www.
dcpubliccharter.com/startschool/docs/DCPS_Audited_Enrollment_Data_Fall_2006.pdf
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five were closed in the summer of 2006. Prior to his departure, former Superintendent Clifford
Janey’s Master Facilities Plan called for the closing of several public schools in light of continued
enrollment declines. This suggests that the market share gained by choice schools has been
recognized and deemed significant.
Concerning quality, even though D.C. charter schools do vary considerably, recent reports
suggest that schools chartered by the D.C. Public Charter School Board (DCPCSB) are, on average,
exhibiting higher achievement than traditional DCPS schools. Schools chartered by the DCPCSB
achieved greater proficiency than traditional DCPS schools for all subjects and grade levels in
2006. Most noteworthy was secondary student performance in math, where 37.9 percent of
DCPCSB charter school students were proficient compared to just 22.7 percent of traditional
DCPS students. On the other hand, while charter schools overseen by the D.C. Board of
Education performed slightly better than traditional DCPS schools in elementary school reading,
they also performed worse than DCPS schools in secondary reading and in math at both levels.22
We would obviously be remiss if we relied solely on the simple use of test scores as a method
of comparison, as selection effects and other omitted variable bias could skew the results
and exaggerate the extent to which students at many charter schools outperform students in
public schools. However, in the end, one would expect public perception to be conditioned by
such measures. If charter schools can point to higher test scores in addition to other features
designed to attract families and students, they stand to gain a greater share of the market.
Several charter schools boast lengthy waiting lists—for example, Capital City’s 600-person
waiting list has prompted the school to consider adding a second campus.23 Likewise, recent
approval by a chartering authority to add an estimated 6,800 students over the next several
years signals that demand is not likely to waver anytime soon. Additionally, the Teske and
Schneider study found that D.C. parents believe that charter schools in the District have better
facilities, are safer, and have “friendlier and more helpful” staff.24 Consequently, District leaders,
principals, and teachers should feel pressure to improve the performance and appeal of DCPS,
either substantively or in image, if public schools are to compete with neighboring charter
schools for student enrollment.

22 AYP results posted on the District of Columbia Public Schools website: http://webb.k12.dc.us/NCLB/
23 Dion Haynes and Theola Labbe, “A Boom for D.C. Charter Schools.” Washington Post, April 25, 2007, A01.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/24/AR2007042402542_pf.html
24 Paul Teske, Mark Schneider, Jack Buckley and Sara Clark. 2000. Does Charter School Competition Improve
Traditional Public Schools? Civic Report 10 (June), Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.

Sullivan – Campbell – Kisida

University of Arkansas – School Choice Demonstration Project

The Muzzled Dog That Didn’t Bark: Charters and the Behavioral Response of D.C. Public Schools

April 2008

While we now see a substantial number of charters striving to provide a high quality
alternative to traditional public schools, the amount of political will and a desire to change
within the District has also emerged in recent years, as demonstrated more fully in the next
section. To the extent that in recent history the district has adopted per pupil funding,
authorized 72 charter schools to date, and implemented a voucher program, one could argue
that DCPS has some degree of political support for reform from its school boards, elected
officials and voters.25 Mayor Adrian Fenty’s recent takeover of the public schools, coupled with
the firing of Superintendent Janey and the appointment of Michelle Rhee as Chancellor of DCPS,
is yet another signal in a long chain of events that suggest D.C. is still moving towards change.
What remains unclear is whether or not the political will to change policy in D.C. transforms
into an administrative competency that truly influences school-level practice, a question we will
explore further in later sections.
Surprisingly, given the strong likelihood that D.C. is in a unique position to give researchers
an opportunity to test theories of choice, little research has evaluated the behavioral response
of D.C. public schools to competition. To date, Paul Teske, Mark Schneider, and their
colleagues at SUNY-Stony Brook have conducted one such study in 2000. As discussed in the
literature review, their study concluded that charter school competition has led urban public
school systems, including that of D.C., to implement specialized programs and other smallscale reforms appealing to parents rather than inducing large-scale reforms in management
or district-wide policies. While this study is useful and informative, only 6,980 students
were enrolled in charter schools then—roughly a third of the amount presently enrolled in
charter schools. Our investigation, now a decade into the charter school era of DCPS, is more
current and has the potential to observe a larger impact as choice has become more prevalent
throughout the District. Choice has become further embedded in the make-up of DCPS over
time, creating a need to re-evaluate any behavioral response in the District as the charter and
choice movements have matured.

25 The District of Columbia has 72 charter schools as of the fall of 2007 according to the Center for Education
Reform website. http://www.edreform.com/index.cfm?fuseAction=stateStats&pSectionID=15&cSectionID=44
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Introduction to the District of Columbia Public Schools
In the nineteenth century, the District of Columbia was a pioneer for public education.
Founded in 1804 and chaired by President Thomas Jefferson, the D.C. Public Schools boasted the
first secondary school for African-Americans by 1870 and was thriving. Yet one hundred years
later, despite judicial attempts to improve the quality of public education for African-Americans
through desegregation, the District’s education system remained deeply divided. White flight
to the Maryland and Virginia suburbs and an increase in private school enrollments were driven
by racial tension and heightened school violence during the Civil Rights Era, such that by the
1970s the DCPS student body was over 90% black and equally as poor. Thus D.C. public school
advocates faced the daunting challenge of improving a public school system that many of the
city’s most elite had left behind.
By the early 1990s, despite decades of attempted incremental reforms, the District of
Columbia was suffering from an unprecedented period of high crime, budget shortfalls, and
mismanagement that affected all areas of governance, including its public schools. In reflecting
on this period, one former public school official lamented, “There’s no excuse for incompetence
anywhere, and there was plenty of that, and there was plenty of corruption, and waste, and
abuse that existed.” Although he acknowledged that relationships with external organizations,
such as Congress and the teachers’ union, made it difficult to implement reform, the same
former public school official described a general apathy towards improving the public schools
that spanned several decades. “You had a city that had chosen to disinvest itself of its children
and of its schools, which was the exact opposite of surrounding jurisdictions which were
investing and, in fact, reinvesting in their children and their schools… and so you had a lack of
political will to improve the school district and a lack of political support to improve it.” Such
a climate provided ample opportunity for proponents of school choice to make an impact,
whether they focused specifically on a competitive model or merely any model that provided an
alternative to the failing status quo.

The Introduction of School Choice
The Republican landslide in the 1994 Congressional elections set the stage for a philosophical
shift in the approach taken to address public policy concerns in the District. Republicans
had long been known for embracing market solutions to social problems, and the increase
of 54 seats in the House of Representatives gave them the majority needed to experiment

Sullivan – Campbell – Kisida

University of Arkansas – School Choice Demonstration Project

The Muzzled Dog That Didn’t Bark: Charters and the Behavioral Response of D.C. Public Schools

April 2008

with a market approach to education reform in D.C. Though an “out of boundaries” process
was already in place to give District students the option to apply to the public school of their
choice, details of implementation made it difficult for most students to transfer to the best
D.C. public schools.26 Following the election, Rep. Steve Gunderson (R-WI) took the lead in
shaping D.C.’s education reform agenda, proposing the creation of a charter school law and a
more controversial voucher program to provide public funds for low-income students to attend
private schools at the urging of some parents and Republican members of Congress. While the
voucher provision lacked District support and did not survive, the provision for charter schools
did, and in 1996, Congress passed D.C.’s charter school law as part of the School Reform Act
of 1995. Although city council members and then-superintendent Franklin Smith had already
advocated for the creation of charter schools, opposition primarily from the Washington
Teachers Union prevented them from moving forward until Congress took the lead.27 In 1996,
D.C. passed its own Public Charter Schools Act. The two charter school laws provided for the
application of up to ten charter schools (later amended to twenty) each year to either the D.C.
Board of Education, which also oversees the District’s traditional public schools, or to the D.C.
Public Charter School Board, an independent organization created under the new law to grant
charters and manage these schools.28
Despite legislative success, the charter school movement started out slowly: only two
schools opened in the first year after the law was enacted, partially due to a lack of support
from Congressional Republicans still irked by the failure of the voucher provision.29 Yet an
even greater impediment was the continuous turnover in District leadership that captured the
attention of most of the D.C. education sector. Persistent financial and managerial troubles
largely due to the bungling rule of Mayor Marion Barry, coupled with an ongoing legal battle
over fire code violations in old school buildings, had just led to a Congressionally appointed

26 The program, still in place today, gives first priority for transfers to students with siblings enrolled in the
desired school, to those who previously attended a feeder school, or to those within walking distance,
ensuring that affluent parents are able to hold their seats in affluent schools.
27 Sara Mead. “Capital Campaign: Early Returns on District of Columbia Charter Schools.” Progressive Policy
Institute, October 2005.
28 However, the D.C. Board of Education recently requested to relinquish its chartering authority, asking that
charter schools under its jurisdiction be transferred to the D.C. Public Charter School Board. The move is
intended to consolidate chartering authority and streamline management of charter schools in the District.
29 Sara Mead. “Capital Campaign: Early Returns on District of Columbia Charter Schools.” Progressive Policy
Institute, October 2005.
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Control Board taking over the public school system in 1995.30 After firing charter supporter
Superintendent Franklin Smith in 1996, the Control Board turned to General Julius Becton
(1996-1998), a retired army general and former director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), in an effort to “rescue” the failing school system with his more despotic
management style. Yet Becton lasted less than eighteen months on the job and left little
impression on the charter school landscape.
By the fall of 1998, however, charter school enrollment skyrocketed. Becton’s replacement,
Chief Academic Officer Arlene Ackerman, was less opposed to charters ideologically than
Becton. However, she was frustrated with the lack of consistency in charter school authorizing
and lack of accountability for charter school growth. This environment set the stage for a bold
policy change that would ultimately force DCPS to feel the financial pains of competition from
charter schools.31 Ackerman’s team adopted a weighted student funding formula where the
money follows the student. Although she and her staff implemented this policy primarily to
overhaul a system that awarded more funding to the most vocal principals and to give schools
more autonomy over their budgets, one former staff member acknowledged that this policy
change secured a minimum funding level for charters at some loss to traditional public schools.
Had traditional public schools not fudged their enrollment numbers until audits began in
2001, and had DCPS not increased the per-pupil allocation every few years, the financial loss to
traditional public schools of student transfers to charters would have been worse.
In addition to changing the school funding mechanism, Ackerman also established a “Parent
Enrollment Fair” to help educate parents about the traditional public schools that existed with
high quality programs and rigor. These initiatives are possibly the first willingness to respond
to charter school competition at a District-level. Yet, like previous D.C. superintendents,
Ackerman’s stay was short-lived. The Control Board hired Superintendent Paul Vance, a
lukewarm charter supporter, to replace her in July of 2000. Thus in the first few years of D.C.
charter schooling, their slow start, rapid growth, and any attempts to respond were entangled
with the more troubling leadership climate.

30 April Witt, “Worn Down by Waves of Change.” Washington Post, June 11, 2007, A01. http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001496_5.html?hpid=topnews
31 April Witt, “Worn Down by Waves of Change.” Washington Post, June 11, 2007, A01. http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001496_5.html?hpid=topnews
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Meanwhile, new plans began brewing to reintroduce vouchers to the District. While previous
attempts spearheaded by Congressional Republicans had failed in 1995, 1997, and 1998, the
new approach was much more business-oriented and had community support. Additionally, it
sought to strengthen District traditional public schools and charter schools as well, a departure
from previous voucher policies. Representatives of Fight for Children, a D.C. organization active
in education reform, helped lead the effort. Even Mayor Williams, facing ongoing pressure
from Mayor John Norquist of Milwaukee, an acquaintance through the U.S. Conference on
Mayors, pledged his support along with Board of Education President Peggy Cooper-Cafritz,
Superintendent Paul Vance, and Council Education Committee chair Kevin Chavous, a previous
voucher opponent. Recognizing the political hurdle of passing a singular voucher bill and the
simultaneous need to get additional resources for D.C. charter and traditional public schools,
the group agreed that a “three-sector strategy” was ideal.
After visiting 109 private schools in the District and enduring numerous meetings in church
basements, many meetings with The Association of Schools of Greater Washington, and “a lot of
coaching and hand-holding” the three-sector advocates had garnered sufficient District support
to approach the White House by the fall of 2002. Over the next several months, meetings
took place between the White House’s domestic policy advisor Margaret Spellings, Secretary
of Education Rod Paige, deputy chief of staff Josh Bolton, President Bush’s chief legal counsel
(and the vice chair of the board of Washington Scholarship Fund) Boyden Gray, AOL founder
Jim Kimsey, Kaleem Caire of Fight for Children, and numerous other corporate leaders who
were working to gain support for the three-sector policy. At the same time, Congressional
Republicans made yet another attempt to push for a D.C. voucher bill of their own. Yet,
according to one meeting participant, Spellings agreed that a three-sector approach was ideal
out of concern that a singular D.C. voucher bill would be “very divisive” and reflect negatively
upon the White House without including support for public schools as well. Throughout the
negotiations, she sought to ensure that the group advocating for the three-sector strategy was
sincere in seeing all three sectors through.
Amidst ongoing debate, a bill was finally introduced to provide funding for traditional public
schools, charter schools, and private school vouchers in the District. After failing to get enough
votes to pass in the Senate in late 2003, the D.C. School Choice Incentive Act of 2003 became law
in early 2004 as part of President Bush’s budget bill. The bill provided annual appropriations
of approximately $45 million to transform D.C. Public Schools, $15 million for charter school
facilities, and $20 million to establish the first ever federally funded K-12 voucher program.
Known as the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, the voucher program is administered by
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the non-profit Washington Scholarship Fund (WSF) and seeks to assist students from families
living at least 185 percent below the poverty line to attend a private school in the District.
Scholarships of up to $7,500 are awarded to eligible children annually, with the highest priority
given to students in schools deemed in need of improvement, corrective action, or restructuring
under NCLB. The Opportunity Scholarship Program is the only D.C. voucher program that
provides full tuition for private school enrollment.
Both charter schools and the voucher program generated considerable backlash from some
members of the D.C. community, including devout public school supporters, residents frustrated
with Congress’ ongoing involvement in D.C. policy-making, and specific to vouchers, those
who were philosophically opposed to providing federal funds for students to attend parochial
schools. Several members of the D.C. education establishment also expressed resentment
regarding the school choice initiative. One elite interviewee, a former member of Superintendent
Vance’s staff, stated that “the goal of the three-sector strategy was to bring all people together
to improve education for all D.C. students,” yet he felt that the outcome was just the opposite.
He went on to argue, “Introducing vouchers was one of the most damaging things to happen to
the D.C. schools—not the vouchers themselves, but the fact that their presence undid everything
we were trying to do.” Such statements, though not necessarily representative of general
sentiment, suggest that school choice programs carry a political symbolism of DCPS failure
for some people, irrespective of their specific goals. As articulated by one former city council
staffer, the growth of school choice generated a self-esteem problem for many within the DCPS
administration, making them very defensive of their “turf” that they perceived to be viewed by
everyone else as a “dump.”
In the overall context of school choice in D.C. today, almost 20,000 students now attend
charter schools, whereas only 2,000 students currently attend a private school in the District
through the voucher program each year—about one-tenth of the number of students who
attend charters. Consequently, vouchers have done little to change the landscape of D.C. public
schools. The cap on the voucher program and lottery admission system prevents any one
District school from experiencing a drastic loss in student enrollment. Furthermore, legislation
stipulates that DCPS be held harmless for the voucher program financially—Mayor Williams
reimbursed DCPS for any per-pupil funds lost to voucher transfers. Thus while this study began
with the intention of investigating the behavioral response of the District of Columbia Public
Schools to both charters and vouchers, it quickly became apparent that charter schools are
the bigger story. Nearly every interviewee and the majority of teachers surveyed discounted
any effects of the voucher program on DCPS. When asked if they knew of any schools that

Sullivan – Campbell – Kisida

University of Arkansas – School Choice Demonstration Project

The Muzzled Dog That Didn’t Bark: Charters and the Behavioral Response of D.C. Public Schools

April 2008

lost pupils as a result of the program, none of the participants responded affirmatively. This
sentiment was so prevalent among participants that we altered our strategy relatively early in
the process to concentrate more thoroughly on charter schools and school choice in general.
Although we asked about vouchers in our survey, focus groups, and interviews, the focus is
mainly on charter schools.

The Behavioral Response of District of Columbia Public Schools
to School Choice Competition
The Elite Perspective
Our study’s first group of interviewees was a host of experts we refer to as “elites” in the
field of education in D.C. They consisted of past and present members of D.C.’s Boards of
Education and City Council, as well as DCPS administrators, consultants, activists, and former
superintendents. Their experiences and expertise provided us with insight into the overarching
issues affecting DCPS, including the role of charter schools.
Very few of our elite interviewees mentioned charter school competition directly when
asked to list the major issues in DCPS over the previous two years. In fact, only two people,
one of whom was involved primarily with District finances, explicitly said that charter school
competition was one of the major issues facing the district. Yet across our elite interviews, 11
of 13 elite interviewees working within DCPS cited declining enrollment or the need to close and
consolidate facilities as among their most pressing problems. In particular, elites acknowledged
that declining enrollment and consequential funding problems have led to the closure of several
public schools and the shifting of school personnel, neither of which is popular with parents or
educators. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the District has lost over 25,000 students over the past 10
years, of which an estimated 76% can conservatively be accounted to charters.32

32 Given the propensity of traditional public schools to over-report their student enrollment prior to the
institution of enrollment audits in 2001, it is likely that charter school transfers account for an even greater
decline in DCPS enrollment than was reported.
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Figure 1. Enrollment Trends in Traditional D.C. Public Schools and Charters
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Though only one elite interviewee initially stated that the push towards facility “right-sizing”
was a result of charter school enrollment, the data suggest that charter schools are the primary
cause of this stance.
The consensus of elites suggested that the political will to close schools amidst declining
enrollment exists, whether elites acknowledge charter school growth as the impetus or not.
For example, one school board member emphatically stated that the “board is unanimously
committed to the idea…for reducing excess space.” Moreover, recent actions taken by the
former Superintendent and city council indicate that other sectors of the elite education
establishment are already responding. At the same time that the majority of these interviews
were being conducted in the spring and summer of 2006, Superintendent Janey announced the
closure of five D.C. public schools citing low enrollment and poor performance, a kick-off to
his newly drafted Master Facilities Plan that was released the following fall. The plan outlines
a five year timeline for the renovation and reconstruction of a majority of D.C. schools, with up
to an additional fifteen schools slated for closure across several phases of right-sizing District
facilities. Around the same time, council member Kathy Patterson successfully pushed for the
passage of a bill to provide capital funding for these school renovations after years of effort.
Despite another school board member’s contention that school consolidation can be “the most
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painful process that communities go through,” our elite interviewees were in agreement that
addressing the facility surplus issue was necessary.
Notwithstanding the elites’ shared vision of right-sizing the District, only five DCPS schools
have been closed since a series of closures took place in 1997. When asked why such a plan
had not transpired earlier, the elites responded unanimously that political consensus across
policy-makers was a relatively new phenomenon. While school choice was a highly contentious
issue several years ago, a majority of the elites that have been continuously involved with DCPS
sensed that opposition to the choice movement has decreased over time as charter schools
become increasingly viewed as an established alternative to traditional public schools. The
debate has changed from one that asks whether or not to allow charters to a debate about
how great an influence charters should have on DCPS. One city council member described this
phenomenon by saying that the board of education is more open and willing to see how charters
perform in order to learn from the results. Moreover, a former superintendent stated, “now
that charter schools are a reality, most public schools are aware that that’s our competition…
there’s an awareness that the school system has to improve or they might lose parents to other
options.” These accounts of increased cooperation in governance, coupled with a greater will
to respond to charter school competition, result in part from a sense that charters are here
to stay and may indicate why a District response to charter school competition could be only
now beginning.
Despite their acknowledgement that DCPS needed to improve in the wake of charter school
competition in addition to facility right-sizing, very few elites could offer examples of specific
District-wide reforms intended to achieve this goal. The only example they provided was the
perception that former Superintendent Janey’s Master Education Plan (MEP) was designed with
the intention of cutting the flow of students outside of DCPS and working to draw them back
into traditional public schools. One former school board member suggested that in designing
the MEP, Janey wanted to bring charter school innovations to public schools within DCPS.
Another former board member credited the MEP with establishing the standards by which all
of the district’s programs would be evaluated, including facilities and budgeting. However, a
representative of the charter community proposed that the MEP would have happened with or
without the advent of charters in the District, opining that the MEP was necessary because of the
general state of DCPS. Contradictions in reporting such as these were common across the elite
interviews, and thus it is difficult to conclude what influence, if any, charter schools might have
had on the Master Education Plan.
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Overall, while the majority of elite interviewees mentioned problems resulting from declining
enrollment, few mentioned charter school competition as a significant issue facing the District
outright. Rather, discussions with elites focused more on resolving facilities, funding, and
leadership issues. Interestingly, when we specifically asked elites about the District’s response
to charter school competition, not only were elites unable to offer much evidence of Districtlevel responses to competition aimed at improving the quality of D.C. public schools, but none
of them suggested that such a response would even take place at a district level. For example,
one former member of the Board of Education stated that responses to competition depend
on school-level leadership and suggested that the district does not do anything to encourage
such changes. Moreover, a city council staffer claimed that it matters most what the PTA and
principals do—this is “where your reforms live or die.” Thus it appears that such a behavioral
response hinges on the motivation of individual schools, not the district as a whole. In fact, all
of the experts that we spoke with expected schools to be doing more to compete with charter
schools, and one optimistic former Board of Education member suggested that although a
“competitive dynamic” hasn’t really happened yet, it may be on the cusp of beginning.

The Principal Perspective
We also spoke with thirteen principals in DCPS to gain an understanding of the major issues
facing individual schools in the district and the concurrent changes taking place.33 Of our
thirteen principals, nine had been in their current positions for less than two years at the time of
the interview. Only two principals had been staffed at their current school for over a decade—a
rarity in DCPS. While the small size of the sample and the relatively low levels of experience of
the participants prevent us from considering the sample to be a comprehensive representation
of all DCPS principals, their observations are important for our understanding of the dynamics
that choice had introduced.
The overarching concern voiced by our sample of principals was a lack of autonomy to hire
and fire teachers, obtain supplies and maintain their facilities. They linked the source of their

33 In order to obtain a sample of principals, we attempted to send an email to every principal in the district.
Due to principal turnover and variance in the structure of email addresses, the e-mail reached a majority of
principals, but not all principals. The email provided a general description of the study and asked them to
reply if they were willing to participate. Principals were promised a gift card for their participation in the
study. In presenting the perspectives of our principal interviewees, we acknowledge that our sample may not
be representative of all DCPS principals.
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frustration to the bureaucracy of the administration and, in the case of staffing decisions, the
limitations brought about by the District’s teacher’s union contract. Unlike elites, only one
principal cited declining enrollment as an issue without prompting. When probed a bit further,
all but one of the principals claimed that charter schools directly affected their enrollment and
were able to describe the enrollment trends at their schools. Eleven of the twelve principals who
spoke to enrollment changes accurately portrayed the trend of their enrollment figures reported
in the DCPS Fall Enrollment Audit Reports over the past several years—seven lost students
while four experienced consistent or growing enrollment. Only one principal underreported the
degree to which her school lost students. While only two principals spoke directly to the need
to gradually cut staff due to declining enrollment, a greater number were focused on the longterm threat of school closure by the District. While acknowledging this threat, most principals
felt disempowered to make the changes in staffing, procurement and facilities maintenance
that they deemed appropriate in reversing negative enrollment trends and instead focused on
recruitment efforts as the next best alternative.
All but two of the principals interviewed from historically under-performing schools that have
been losing students to charter schools said that school-level recruiting efforts have increased
over the past several years, and two secondary principals were happy to report that since
“vigorously recruiting” their enrollments have already improved. As one of these principals
noted, to generate change we “need an entrepreneurial spirit in D.C.” Principals cited the use of
common recruiting tools such as e-mail, flyers, open houses, newsletters, radio ads, newspaper
ads, church meetings, and other methods of advertising their schools in hopes of increasing
enrollments. Three principals even described the creation of advisory boards at their respective
schools to spearhead recruitment efforts. Of the two principals who admitted losing students
to charter schools but did not recruit or advertise, one principal claimed to be without the
resources to do so. The other principal stated that she does not recruit students for fear that
advertising will attract the “bottom of the barrel,” an outcome that is tough for her to swallow
in an NCLB accountability era. In reflecting on the evolution of her attitude towards charter
schools, she concluded, “I’m not as concerned as I used to be; I’ve adjusted.”
That principals used recruitment tools to increase student enrollment is not as noteworthy
as is the fact that they initiated these recruiting efforts independent of the administration. The
DCPS administration did not provide these principals with advertising templates or instructions.
In fact, only one principal recalled receiving directions from an assistant superintendent to
establish advertising practices. Although one elite interviewee avowed that there is momentum
towards starting a public relations campaign at the District-level, it has yet to be seen. At
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present, the principals considered District involvement in encouraging advertising to be limited
to only the threat of school closures in the event that enrollments did not increase. Thus the
individual schools took the initiative to develop marketing practices and techniques on their
own. Interestingly, our principal interviewees were not aware of specific recruitment strategies
employed by other schools, and three principals clearly indicated that they did not think
that other schools advertised at all. Principals from the New Leaders for New Schools (NLNS)
program demonstrated a greater familiarity and success with advertising programs than did
other principals, describing advertising as a normal part of the job rather than something done
in response to declining enrollments.34 This begs the question as to whether or not principals’
advertising efforts were a direct response to competition or were part of standard operating
procedures learned through training programs such as those required for NLNS principals.
In order to determine the best methods for advertising, several of the principals in our
sample conducted surveys to ascertain the needs and desires of parents and families in their
neighborhoods. Based on these surveys, principals believe that District parents are looking for
renovated and/or new facilities, pre-K and International Baccalaureate (IB) programs, school
uniforms, and adult classes in parenting and English. The physical appearance of school
buildings was said to have the greatest impact on enrollment trends. Due to their understanding
of parents’ preferences in selecting schools, several principals mentioned a common push
towards making their schools span pre-kindergarten to 8th grades in order to compete with
charter middle schools.35 We noted that principals did not tend to focus on test scores or
academic achievement in their lists of attributes that parents sought when selecting schools.
Instead, efforts to raise test scores were aimed at meeting the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)
standards of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).
Overall, it was clear that boosting enrollment is the motivation that many principals have
in mind when they establish programs such as these, and as such, proponents of school
choice might argue that competition is having its intended effect on traditional public schools.
However, advocates of charter schools often argue that they can improve the quality of

34 It should also be noted that four of the thirteen principals come from the New Leaders for New Schools
(NLNS) program. This program specializes in training educators to succeed as principals in urban areas and
currently supplies roughly one-third of the District’s principals according to a NLNS D.C. staff member.
35 According to the elementary principals in our sample, enrollment tends to decline, even in “good” schools, at
the 4th and 5th grade in traditional public schools because parents move their children to private and charter
schools with the hope of gaining favorable admission status to private and charter middle schools due to
their perception that DCPS secondary schools are of poor quality.
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instruction within public schools through competition. According to our sample, it appears
that most of the changes that schools are making in order to attract more students have more
to do with services for parents and the image of the school than with improving the educational
attainment of students.

The Teacher Perspective
In order to delve further into the behavioral response to charter schools within DCPS over the
past few years, we held four focus groups with 24 teachers and surveyed 143 teachers from a
variety of grade levels and special education fields.36 Survey questions asked about the structure
and composition of classrooms, the amount of preparation time for classroom activities, teacher
contact with parents or guardians, classroom observations of teachers, sources of support for
teachers, teacher control over classroom resources and practices, teacher roles in setting school
policy and practice, school working conditions, school reform efforts, teacher reactions to school
reform proposals, and future teaching plans.37 The focus groups touched on similar issues,
while probing a bit deeper into the teacher-perceived impetus for changes in the aforementioned
policies and behaviors.38
The teacher survey was to be distributed to teachers in thirty-two D.C. elementary schools,
selected equally from four cells (i.e., 8 schools per cell) at random to participate in the survey:

36 The teacher survey was designed according to similar surveys administered by Frederick Hess (2001, 2002) in
previous analyses of competitive effects.
37 A crucial concern was the threat of unacceptably low survey response rates since the survey asked teachers
to participate in an exercise that is prompted by reforms they may generally find misguided or threatening.
To encourage survey response and attain more honest responses under such conditions, teacher names were
not required and the surveys were coded discretely with a unique school identification number. In addition, a
$25 American Express gift card was offered to teachers upon completion of the survey. To protect participant
confidentiality even further, respondents were provided with a separate envelope to provide contact
information for receipt of the gift card apart from returning the survey.
38 To attract participants for the focus groups, we collected e-mail addresses for as many teachers as possible
through individual school websites. We also contacted several education related organizations and asked
for their assistance in locating teachers who were willing to participate. Participants received gift cards for
participating in the focus groups and for completing the survey. Clearly, our sample of teachers participating
in focus groups is not a representative sample of DCPS teachers either. The sample may be biased due to its
reliance on teachers who read their e-mails and teach at schools with websites. Additionally, the participants
drawn through other organizations might have a bias towards the causes of those organizations. The sample
may be biased further by the fact that these teachers were willing to attend the focus groups. While we
attempted to draw teachers from every area of DCPS, we were not able to do so with such a small sample.
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Northwest Schools In Need of Improvement under NCLB (designated SINI), Northwest non-SINI,
non-Northwest SINI, and non-Northwest non-SINI.39 Unfortunately, teacher survey data were only
collected from twenty-three of the original thirty-two schools in the sample due to problems
with District cooperation.40 As a result, schools located in the southern-most tip of Anacostia,
an area representing some of the poorest and most segregated African-American neighborhoods
in the District, are underrepresented in the sample. Fortunately, schools that did participate
in the survey represent all geographic quadrants of the city, all political wards, and both SINI
and non-SINI status under NCLB, suggesting that there is enough variation in schools across the
sample to support some general data analysis. Moreover, as Figure 2 illustrates on the following
page, the teachers that participated in the survey came from schools that follow the same
general trend of enrollment declines as DCPS on the whole.

39 The purpose of the stratification was twofold. First, the NW quadrant is more affluent and whiter than the
other city quadrants, and such students presumably have the option of attending a private school using their
own resources. NW schools are also reputed to be safer and of higher quality than most other D.C. Public
Schools. Second, the SINI designation is a national standard for judging a school’s performance in math,
reading, and attendance (to ensure that the majority of the qualifying student body took the test) under
NCLB. SINI classifications for the purpose of creating a stratified sample were determined by whether or
not a school made AYP in reading, math, and attendance in 2005, the most recent year for which data were
available.
40 Prior to delivering the surveys to all of the schools in the sample, the researchers received notice from the
District that their paperwork submitted for research project approval was incomplete and they were to
discontinue distribution of the survey until the research project was formally approved. This notice came five
months after Georgetown University researchers originally submitted their paperwork for research project
approval and attempted to follow up numerous times with phone calls and emails. Although the research
team resubmitted the requested follow-up paperwork and was promised a response from the District in 2-4
weeks, six months after re-filing and eleven months after initially filing the paperwork, at the time of this
publication the District has failed to respond.
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Figure 2. Capacity Trends in DCPS and Teacher Sample
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As with the teacher survey, the teacher focus groups are also subject to bias due to our
inability to obtain teacher names from the District to generate a random sample. Thus we will
proceed with describing the results of our teacher survey and focus groups acknowledging that
they might not be representative of all DCPS teachers.
Teacher Perceptions of Charter School Competition
Through the teacher survey, we first attempted to gauge teacher awareness of enrollment
trends as the elite and principal interviews suggested that this was the most visible evidence
of charter school competition. According to the survey data, teachers were well aware of their
school’s enrollment patterns. Considering that teachers probably base their perceptions of
enrollment declines more on general trends than specific annual counts, we used a measure
of the difference in percent at capacity enrollment from a recent period, 2002 through 2005,
and compared it to how teachers responded to a question regarding their perceptions of recent
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enrollment trends.41 Of the teachers from schools that experienced actual declines over this
period, 90% reported that they had indeed perceived recent declines. Teachers at schools that
experienced gains were somewhat less accurate, with only 69% correctly reporting gains when
they had in fact occurred. Using a lengthier longitudinal measure of enrollment changes since
charter inception, 97% of the teachers from schools that experienced over a 10% decline during
this period accurately reported they had perceived recent declines. Thus, when we focus on
the simple question of whether or not teachers were conscious of enrollment patterns, we are
confident that they were, especially where declines are concerned. The fact that the teachers
were aware of the enrollment trends gives us confidence that their responses to other survey
questions and participation in focus groups reflected an informed view of the enrollment
situation.
In order to probe the impact of school choice further, the survey asked teachers about the
extent to which charter schools and the voucher program played a role in the District in the past
two years. Generally speaking, the teachers seemed to be of the opinion that charter schools
played a large role, while vouchers did not. Additionally, as evidenced by the high levels of
“Don’t Know” responses in Figure 3 and Figure 4, more teachers were either unfamiliar with the
voucher program or ambivalent concerning its effects.

41 The public elementary school capacity statistics used in this analysis are those most recently generated by the
21st Century School Fund to replace previously published school capacity statistics deemed to be inaccurate.
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Figure 3. The Perceived Impact of Reforms
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However, surveyed teachers were also asked to project the impact of these reforms over the next
few years, and while the results are essentially unchanged for charter schools, there is a
noticeable upward shift in the perceived importance that vouchers might play in the future. For
example, as Figure 4 shows, the percentage of respondents who felt that vouchers would play an
insignificant role drops from 12% to 7%, while those thinking vouchers would play a very
significant role rises from 20% to 28%.

Sullivan – Campbell – Kisida

University of Arkansas – School Choice Demonstration Project

25

26

The Muzzled Dog That Didn’t Bark: Charters and the Behavioral Response of D.C. Public Schools

April 2008

Figure 4: The Perceived Future Impact of Reforms
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To determine whether or not teachers felt competitive pressure from school choice directly,
the teacher survey asked teachers if they thought that enrollment changes at their respective
schools were a result of charters, vouchers, or local population changes. The overwhelming
consensus amongst teachers was that charters were most responsible for the effect. As shown
in Figure 5, which is broken down by teachers that perceive their schools to have had declining
enrollment over the past year of over 50 students or less than 50 students, most teachers
attributed the trend to charters more than local population changes and vouchers combined.
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Figure 5: Causes of Enrollment Decline by Teachers’ Perceptions
If your school enrollment rose or fell, which reasons do you
believe might have caused the change?
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The evidence from the teacher survey gives us reason to conclude that most teachers are
aware of declining enrollment and consider school choice alternatives to be significant now and
in the future. Teachers participating in focus groups were also aware of enrollment declines,
which they largely attributed to charter schools, and the focus group format allowed us to probe
them regarding the impact of losing students. Most teacher focus group participants agreed
that loss of students to charters was a financial concern. Many teachers expressed frustration
with students returning from charter schools mid-year and disrupting their routine too late to
bring their per-pupil allocation back with them. One teacher, however, expressed a dissenting
viewpoint. “About losing kids, I disagree [that all teachers are concerned]. I worked at two
schools before coming to [school name], and if they had kids there, it was a good day. Because
it’s that hard. When I had a full class of kids there, I was ready to pull my hair out…. I’m not
going to call parents and get kids to come who are obnoxious, I’ll be blunt…so when they don’t
come I’m not going to worry about them going to another school or whatever. You know, I’m

Sullivan – Campbell – Kisida

University of Arkansas – School Choice Demonstration Project

27

28

The Muzzled Dog That Didn’t Bark: Charters and the Behavioral Response of D.C. Public Schools

April 2008

lucky if I can survive. And I look at them closing schools and putting all these kids now together
into one room—it’s going to be a zoo.” Though focus group participants disagreed somewhat
on the impact of charter school enrollments on their respective schools or classrooms, they
unanimously expressed an awareness of the direction of these trends. With that in mind, we
now turn to specific responses to charter school competition reported by teachers in the survey
and by those who participated in the focus groups.
Teacher-Reported Changes in Public School-Level Policies and Behaviors
With regard to how schools have reportedly responded to competition from charter schools,
both the teacher survey and the teacher focus groups suggest that teachers at schools facing
declining enrollment are less involved in school-wide policymaking than they were several years
ago. In a separate quantitative analysis conducted by the authors, teachers who reported a
loss of students to charter schools were more likely to report a decline in their involvement in
shaping the school budget, establishing classroom discipline policies, arranging class schedules,
and hiring new teachers.42 While teacher participants in the focus groups did not comment
on their involvement in establishing the school budget, classroom discipline policies, or class
schedules, they told a similar story in regards to their participation in hiring new teachers. Many
teachers described their former involvement in teacher hiring as participants on their schools’
local school restructuring team (LSRT) committees, bemoaning that principals consulted this
body less frequently as enrollment declines worsened. These findings suggest that schools
experiencing the most competition from charter schools reportedly provide less opportunity for
teacher involvement in crafting school-wide policy. This is not to say that we have identified
a causal relationship, as many factors are at play in the matter, but rather that a correlation
appears to exist between competition and teacher involvement in policy.
Second, the teacher survey indicates that a strong relationship exists between teacher
observation and actual enrollment declines. Patterns were evident when analyzed by breaking
the sample into three subgroups based upon three levels of enrollment declines--over 30% loss,
10-30%, and less than 10%. According to Figure 6, teachers from schools that had more than a
30% loss in enrollment at capacity from 1999-2005 reported being observed by administrators

42 In a bivariate regression of teacher-reported loss of students to charter schools on teacher-reported
participation in crafting various school-wide policies, the following were found to be significant: shaping
the school budget (p=0.049), establishing classroom discipline policies (p=0.000), arranging class schedules
(p=0.013), and hiring new teachers (p=0.001).
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at nearly six times the rate that teachers in schools with the lowest losses reported. The results
concerning the amount they were observed by other teachers show an even greater disparity
between the schools experiencing high rates of loss and those that did not.

Figure 6: Teacher Reported Observations
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Naturally it is difficult to determine exactly what this relationship means. On the one hand,
more outside observation of teachers could be a simple reaction by administrators who are
troubled by enrollment declines. On the other hand, it could be the case that the primary causal
mechanism is poor performance, which in turn is causing both an exodus from schools that
are under-performing as well as bringing increased oversight from administrators. However, it
is worth noting that poor performance has plagued DCPS for some time, while programs that
give students options are relatively recent. It is likely that the introduction of choice was a
catalyst for increased efforts by administrators to oversee the duties of their staff. Either way,
teacher focus group participants said that whenever being observed by principals or District
administrators, they were careful to use the classroom techniques promoted by the District.
However, they admitted that they did not use these techniques under normal conditions.
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Finally, teacher focus group participants indicated an array of other school-level efforts to
increase attendance. Consistent with the principal interviews, teacher focus group participants
said that most of the changes related to boosting enrollment were predominantly related to the
image of the school, as opposed to improved instruction. They listed changes such as boutique
programs, better use of technology, pre-K programs and an increased emphasis on open houses.
Overall, we found that teachers understand the need to maintain a good image in order
to boost student enrollment, yet they did not feel compelled to change their behavior in the
classroom as a result of competition. Specifically, when asked how district-wide changes
affected their instruction, they routinely replied that they had not changed their approaches to
teaching. When being observed, many reported that they “put on a show” to ensure that they
appear to be doing what their principals and the district tell them to do. Thus despite their
decreased involvement in school policy-making and increased observation by superiors, teachers
do not feel pressured to compete with charter schools.

Barriers to a Behavioral Response to
School Choice Competition
Using the perspectives of each group above, we attempted to piece together the inner
workings of school choice in D.C. We sought an explanation as to why choice has not brought
about as much of a behavioral response as many would expect in a district that appears to have
the necessary inputs. Our findings revealed three major stumbling blocks to reform: 1) a lack
of a truly competitive model that identifies and facilitates a desired response from key players
to respond to competition, 2) an inability of schools to initiate reforms independently, and 3) an
unclear focus on improving school quality as a means of attracting clients.

Lack of a Truly Competitive Model
While choices may be necessary for a competitive model to operate efficiently, choice alone
does not equate to competition. Only when there are both incentives and penalties attached
to outcomes can a system be truly described as competitive. Moreover, the benefits of a
competitive system operate most effectively if the incentives and penalties of competition are
communicated and felt at all levels of the system. When implementing organizational and
cultural change, obtaining buy-in from key stakeholders is essential for success. DCPS appears
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to have failed at motivating its stakeholders at all levels, particularly due to inconsistent
leadership, a lack of punishment for poor performance, and poor communication with teachers.
The elites and principals from our samples described a school district that grappled with
a lack of consistent leadership and general political friction among the boards of education,
mayor, city council, Congress, and a host of superintendents. In particular, they felt strongly
that the revolving doors to the Superintendent’s Office over the years had a negative affect
on the district as a whole. Over the past decade since charter schools came to D.C., the
District has experienced considerable turnover in leadership, with 5 superintendents, 3
interim superintendents, and now a new chancellor in 11 years, not to mention 2 school board
management structures.43 Without a Superintendent who stayed long enough to create and
implement a plan, it was difficult to hold anyone accountable for the district’s failures. And
without a sense of accountability and stability at the top level, it was difficult to establish
consistent priorities for the rest of the district. As long as priorities are not established for a
program’s implementation, it is less likely that stakeholders like principals and teachers will
buy-in to the program.
The inconsistent direction from the administration has left it vulnerable to political
opposition when attempting to reinforce the competitive framework within the choice model.
For example, in order to quell the concerns of those resistant to the school choice movement,
the Mayor of D.C. has traditionally promised to replenish any funds lost to DCPS as a result of
students using vouchers to attend private schools. And while traditional public schools have not
been similarly reimbursed for enrollment losses to charters, the portions of school budgets that
are based on enrollment figures have been based upon enrollment figures from the prior year.
Since public schools are losing students every year to charter schools, this means that school
budgets are based on inflated enrollment figures and therefore delay the financial impact of
declining enrollment such as laying off more teachers. Many of our elite interviewees contend
that without more serious financial hardship resulting directly from enrollment declines,
competition from charter schools will not inspire an adequate response from schools that
lose students.

43 The unelected Financial Control and Management Assistance Authority, known as the Control Board, replaced
the all elected school board from 1996-2000. Since 2000, a hybrid school board made up of elected and
appointed members has led DCPS.
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Another example of the district’s inability to make necessary tough calls in the wake of
competition is their failure to close a sufficient number of public schools as their enrollment
declined prior to the creation of former Superintendent Janey’s MEP. Although twelve schools
have been closed since the advent of charters and between fifteen and twenty additional schools
are targeted for consolidation, some people suggest that this effort is insufficient. Bowing to
political pressure to keep schools open, public schools continue to operate well below capacity,
a costly inefficiency that runs contrary to a competitive framework. The failure of the District
to close enough schools in the face of severe enrollment declines illustrates the consequences
of a weak and inconsistent leadership struggling to obtain a true commitment to a competitive
model from the general public.
While the District’s leadership has not done an optimal job of motivating many stakeholders,
feedback from the principals we spoke with indicates a strong degree of attention to the
competitive model. Principals are aware of enrollment declines and the potential for school
closures as a result. Thus they are cognizant of the impact that such declines have on their
job security. Given the efforts that some principals make to attract students, it appears
that principals are responding to competition for pupils. If anyone is held accountable for
maintaining student enrollment levels, it is principals. On the other hand, this attention
to accountability does not reach the teachers that principals supervise. Despite teachers’
awareness of enrollment trends, as profiled above, there is little personal incentive for them to
attempt to retain students—the fact that their school is losing students should, in the simplest
sense, make their jobs easier. Furthermore, many teachers questioned the nature of the
competitive model. Some showed animosity towards charters, describing the charter movement
as an attempt to put traditional public schools out of business. As one teacher opined, “They
want us to fail. They want to close these public schools.” One teacher discussed her doubts in
the political motivations behind the movement, stating, “I think a lot of people are using us from
the Hill as a guinea pig to see what they can push here so they can go home and try to replicate
it back in their districts.”
Others discussed varying degrees of willingness among their colleagues to accept reforms put
in place in their schools. Younger teachers described veterans as being reluctant to collaborate
with their less experienced peers. Veteran teachers appeared to be less enthusiastic about
district mandated changes to the curriculum, perhaps jaded by the variety of reforms that have
come and gone over the years. And when such reforms were instituted, the teachers reported,
principals rarely described the reasons for the change. It is difficult to inspire change in a
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group that is unaware of the rationale behind the reforms taking place. All of these sentiments
contributed to both a reluctance to change and a distaste for the choice movement.
With little recourse for a lack of response to enrollment declines from teachers, principals
are left to their own devices to prod their teachers to work towards a collective goal. This is a
difficult task without the ability to affect teachers’ job status or earnings and even more difficult
when teachers feel out of the loop or alienated when changes are implemented. As such,
some teachers do not feel an urgency to respond to declines in enrollment and only feel truly
threatened by the prospect of school closures.

Inability for Principals to Mount School Improvements
While the failure to incorporate incentives and consequences has impeded the development
of the competitive model in DCPS, some would contend that even with such motivation, public
schools are not in a position to make the changes necessary to compete for students. Without
district intervention, individual schools are on their own to sink or swim. Leaving financial
resources out of the equation, and assuming that principals know what improvements need to
be made to retain students, it can be argued that public schools are not prepared to adequately
compete in the education market for two reasons: 1) lack of principal autonomy in core
functions, and 2) inadequate personnel resources required to successfully right the ship.
Despite the passage of the Home Rule Act in 1974 intended to leave the District free
to self-govern, D.C. public schools are still subject to considerable control by the federal
government. Most burdensome is the requirement that DCPS follow the congressional budget
cycle beginning in October, rather than in June or July like most school systems. Thus it is
extremely challenging for budget decisions to be made at both a District and school-level
regarding teacher hiring and professional development, textbooks and supplemental resources,
facility improvements, and student support services, prior to knowing actual budget figures.
As a former superintendent explained, without a separate D.C. budget office “it was difficult to
manage a function that you don’t have control over.” From our interviews, we surmised that
this unique relationship is a contributing factor to a burdensome bureaucracy surrounding the
District’s procurement process and facilities maintenance.
The school-level experiences of our principal interviewees articulated these problems. The
procurement process was criticized for taking too long, resulting in difficulty obtaining supplies
for classrooms. These claims are consistent with reports from the Washington Post throughout
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2007 of general mismanagement and corruption within the administration.44 For example, a
recent article described an incredulous Schools Chancellor Michelle Rhee castigating the central
administration for its failure to purchase and distribute books in a timely and orderly manner.45
Principals desired increased autonomy to ensure the timely receipt of such supplies. Meanwhile,
maintenance was consistently described as unreliable. Several principals suggested that a lack
of urgency on the part of the district resulted in long delays in service, a claim corroborated by
a Washington Post article in 2007 stating that “(p)rincipals reporting dangerous conditions or
urgently needed repairs in their buildings wait, on average, 379 days – a year and two weeks –
for the problems to be fixed. Of 146 school buildings, 113 have a repair request pending for
a leaking roof, a Washington Post analysis of school records shows.”46 Along with a lack of
urgency in responding to maintenance issues and supply requests, the district was said to have
problems in communicating effectively with principals, due in part to the high turnover rate in
assistant superintendents.
A second concern articulated by principals is the inability to hire and fire teachers as they
see fit due to collective bargaining agreements. While principals can identify and interview
candidates to fill teaching positions, district administrators must adhere to district and union
policies in staffing schools. As a result, sometimes principals are not able to hire their preferred
teachers. What is often assumed, and what our aforementioned finding of greater scrutiny
from administrators reported by teachers at schools with large enrollment losses suggests, is
that teachers will be pressured to improve from above—from principals and administrators—or
face consequences. Yet the contract between the district and the teachers union requires a
painstaking and time-consuming process in order to fire teachers. The process is so detailed
that many principals do not attempt to start the process, knowing that they will be unable to
follow the necessary steps with 100% compliance. This means that principals must make do
with their staff, no matter how weak any individual members are. The most common means for
parting with teachers is to find a way to eliminate a position, which generally requires a decline
in enrollment and/or an increase in class size. Teachers lost through such changes are referred
to as Excess Teachers and they earn priority in placement as the district seeks to fill other
vacancies. What this boils down to is that while held accountable for school performance and

44 Washington Post website: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/interactives/dcschools/#fullseries
45 Theola Labbe and Dion Haynes, “Rhee Blasts Textbook Process For Letting Supplies Languish.” Washington
Post, August 4, 2007.
46 Dan Keating and Dion Haynes, “Can D.C. Schools Be Fixed?” Washington Post, June 10, 2007, A01.
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in many cases wanting to implement changes, principals lack the ability to control the quality of
their teaching staffs and do not have an effective means of motivating teachers to adopt student
retention goals.
The teachers in our sample were not unsympathetic to principals’ desires to remove
ineffective teachers. Younger teachers were more likely to suggest a better means for removing
ineffective teachers and complained that the low quality of applicants in the Excess Teacher
pool created an incentive for principals to maintain larger class sizes in order to avoid hiring
Excess Teachers. Veteran teachers were more inclined to resist teacher firings, not because
they disagreed with the fact that some teachers were ineffective, but because of a sense of
camaraderie. In spite of their differences in opinion, both young and veteran teachers agreed
that it is extremely difficult for teachers to be fired. They contended that teachers were
only threatened by losing their jobs in the event of a school closure, not as a result of a poor
performance review.
As a result of these experiences, the principals we spoke with would prefer to have greater
autonomy over staffing, purchasing, and maintenance services in order to improve their schools
in a way that more directly affects the quality of education received by their students. Without
this authority, many principals of public schools focus their attention on improving image and
providing family services as a means of increasing enrollment because the bureaucracy of the
district inhibits their ability to make other changes that the principals believe would improve
their schools’ performance. From a theoretical perspective, it only makes sense to offer a
greater degree of autonomy to principals as they are held increasingly accountable for their
results. Interestingly, the principals in our sample felt that, throughout the district, principal
autonomy increased along with better school performance, indicating that the best schools were
the most capable of making school initiated improvements.
This concept alludes to an ironic wrinkle in the theory of competitive effects. Proponents
argue that failing schools will somehow respond positively to competition, in light of the fact
that they are, well, failing. Mired by a host of existing problems, it seems likely that at some
point poor performance has become so prevalent, such a deeply ingrained aspect of a failing
school, that concocting a turn-around from the inside is simply an unreasonable expectation. If
it is the case that the highest numbers of students fleeing are doing so from the worst schools in
any system, then such a theory almost necessitates action from the very schools where we have
the least expectation such a response would be possible. Realizing this anomaly should lead
policymakers to retool their specific concepts of what types of behavioral responses could work
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and prove most effective in reversing the inertia of failure at troubled schools. It might also lead
policymakers to more eagerly accept the prospect of closing failing schools that are unlikely to
turn around.
In the case of D.C., all signs point to the notion that the schools that are losing students are
indeed struggling, and are potentially in no position to respond directly. To begin with, they
have been overwhelmingly designated as failing to meet the AYP standards initiated by NCLB.
Of the 15 schools represented in the teachers’ survey that failed to achieve AYP in 2005, 12
have experienced more than a ten percent loss in enrollment proportional to their capacity since
1997. If these schools remain open, they are the least equipped to make improvements without
external assistance.
Another indication of a dysfunction among schools losing students was detected through
our survey data regarding teacher satisfaction with certain aspects of their working conditions.
When examining their responses in the context of enrollment declines, a clear pattern emerges.
As can be seen in Table 1, teachers at schools with heavier enrollment losses are more
dissatisfied with their work environment. For example, teachers at schools with minimal losses
or gains were nearly twice as likely to agree with the statement that they “look forward to each
working day” than teachers at schools with the heaviest losses. Additionally, the teachers at the
schools with smaller enrollment losses had more positive responses concerning the clarity of
the school’s goals, the innovation of their peers, and the extent to which their school “rewards
excellence.”

Table 1: Teacher Satisfaction and Frustration Measures
Percent of Teachers who Strongly Agree/Agree
Over 30% Loss

10-30% Loss

10% Loss-Gain

I usually look forward to each working day

46%

49%

91%

Goals for the school are clear

51%

58%

79%

Teachers continuously seek new ideas

54%

63%

91%

My school rewards excellence

45%

44%

79%

Additionally, teachers were asked about their efficacy as instructors. As Table 2 illustrates,
schools with heavy enrollment declines report high levels of frustration with student behavior,
a lack of confidence in the students they are charged with educating, and almost a third of them
feel that their own success or failure is beyond their control. In contrast, only 3% of teachers at
schools that experienced smaller declines or gains in enrollment agreed that their students were
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not capable of learning the required material and only 6% agreed that their success or failure
was beyond their control.

Table 2: Teacher Efficacy as Instructor
Percent of Teachers who Strongly Agree/Agree
Over 30% Loss

10-30% Loss

10% Loss-Gain

Student behavior interferes with my classroom
instruction

63%

57%

30%

My success or failure in teaching is due to factors
beyond my control

34%

33%

6%

Many students are not capable of learning the
required material

41%

30%

3%

While there is a clear pattern amongst teachers’ attitudes and school enrollment trends, it
is difficult to interpret exactly what these findings mean in terms of causality. It could be the
case that poorly managed schools with low morale are losing students to competitors. It could
also be the case that the enrollment declines are causing some teachers to have more negativity
towards their schools and their students, especially if the most difficult students are the ones
who are sticking it out in the most troubled schools.
Such negativity is also present in the reported work relationships of schools that are losing
students. Relationships between teachers and other teachers, teachers and parents, and
teachers and their administrators in schools that are experiencing more competitive effects
could be more innovative—or more strained—depending on the conditions of the responses to
competition.
When we examine the attitude that the teachers have towards their administrators at
schools with declining enrollment there is strong evidence of frustration and dysfunction (see
Table 3). Whether it is because of the higher reported levels of administrators “looking over
their shoulder” or part of a larger environment of tension and strained relationships, over
twice as many teachers from schools that are not experiencing large enrollment declines agree
(73%) that their administrators are helpful when it comes to solving classroom problems. Only
around a third of teachers at schools experiencing the most loss agree that their administrators
are helpful.

Sullivan – Campbell – Kisida

University of Arkansas – School Choice Demonstration Project

37

38

The Muzzled Dog That Didn’t Bark: Charters and the Behavioral Response of D.C. Public Schools

April 2008

Table 3: Are administrators helpful?
Do [school administrators] help improve your teaching or help solve classroom problems?
School Enrollment Capacity

Percent of Teachers who Strongly Agree/Agree

Over 30% Loss

34%

10-30% Loss

54%

10% Loss or Gain

73%

Digging deeper into the specific qualities of this finding, the results of the survey suggest that
the teachers at the schools experiencing high enrollment declines feel like they are less trusted
than schools without high losses. As shown in Table 4, they do not feel as much encouragement
to try new approaches, are not consulted before decisions are made, and only 32% feel as if
their administrators support their efforts to improve their curriculum. Also worth noting is
that they are not as happy with the hiring and firing practices of their superiors—noting both
dissatisfaction with their administrators’ ability to hire the best teachers and to remove the ones
that are failing.

Table 4: Frustration and Friction between Teachers and Administrators
Percent of Teachers who Strongly Agree/Agree
Principal/Administrator:

10% Loss-Gain

10-30% Loss

Over 30% Loss

They encourage me to try new classroom
approaches

97%

71%

62%

Protects from outside pressure that may interfere

67%

38%

26%

Consults teachers before making decisions that
affect them

48%

37%

27%

They effectively put new programs in place

70%

43%

29%

They support teacher efforts to improve curriculum

85%

53%

32%

They set clear expectations for staff

58%

42%

46%

They ensure teachers serve students or remove them

48%

33%

19%

They hire the highest caliber of new teachers

70%

36%

39%

The story of dysfunction illustrated by Table 4 could be a straightforward and accurate
depiction by the teachers in our survey that calls into question the leadership capabilities
of administrators at schools with heavy enrollment losses. However, this same pattern of
findings could also suggest that administrators are making an effort to respond and teachers
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are resentful of the added oversight and loss of autonomy. In a perfect system, administrators
would be responsible for the productivity of their teachers and the guessing game of identifying
who is responsible for success or failure would become moot. But, because administrators
can usually cite the many ways in which their hands are tied with respect to choosing and
controlling their staff, it is impossible to determine exactly where the buck stops.

Unclear Focus on Improving School Quality as a Response
In the previous section, we point out that schools that show signs of a response to
competition vary in their abilities to respond productively, and when they do respond, they
are oftentimes preoccupied with the image and reputation of the school instead of its overall
quality. This leads us to ask the question, “Does satisfying the desires of parents lead to
better schools?” One approach to this question comes down to a discussion about the merits
of paternalism as we decide if parents are in fact making the best decisions for their children.
But we must also ask whether or not competition is serving students well in the aggregate.
Competition came to D.C. in response to institutionalized segregation and insufficient services
to poor and minority families. How is the competitive market in DCPS affecting this dynamic?
Clouding these discussions is the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). Only 20.1% of traditional
D.C. public schools made Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) in both reading and math in 2007.47
Principals and teachers acknowledged district-wide efforts to improve the curriculum and
standards while increasing the focus on test preparation were primarily focused on compliance
with NCLB. They generally agreed that NCLB provides a greater push towards accountability
and creates a greater sense of urgency around improving test scores than does charter school
competition. An example of this pressure given by principals was the increasing emphasis on
student test scores in principal evaluations. In addition, one principal reported that she was
told by the district to hold a mandatory Saturday school session for all students in order to
prepare for an upcoming test.
As an additional input, NCLB complicates the school choice model. Teachers and principals
strive to improve test scores and academic performance in order to achieve the AYP standards
of NCLB, seemingly disassociating academic performance with the need to maintain enrollment
standards in response to competition from charter schools. Competition from school choice,

47 District of Columbia Public Schools website: http://webb.k12.dc.us/NCLB/schoolsSummaryReports.asp
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therefore, is not solely responsible for efforts to improve school quality. In fact, based on
our interviews with principals, we believe that choice dampens principals’ efforts to improve
the academic quality of their schools as it draws their attention more towards other means of
attracting parents and students. Choice encourages principals to market the images of and
family services provided by their schools in order to avoid losing students, while the threat of
NCLB regulations pushes more towards the improvement of the quality of education. Part of
this disparity may be related to principals’ self-proclaimed powerlessness to make the changes
necessary to improve their schools’ performance, as detailed above. As it stands now in DCPS,
school choice evokes a behavioral response from schools, but it is not the response that many
expected, in part due to the influence of NCLB.

Summary
An examination of the inner-workings of the D.C. education establishment suggests a
disconnect between the priorities of the educational elites and the dilemmas haunting principals
and teachers in public schools. Market forces that are expected to spur a competitive response
to school choice are watered down by the lack of a true commitment to a competitive model
that incorporates serious consequences for failure. The efforts to enforce a competitive model
are hampered by political dynamics and burdensome regulations. Specifically, district leaders,
preoccupied with leadership problems and administrative headaches, have concentrated their
efforts on politics, budgeting and school choice, leaving individual schools to respond to
charter school competition on their own. Meanwhile, individual schools have struggled with
staffing, procurement and maintenance issues for decades. Thus principals are not responding
to competition from charter schools in the ways that elites expected because they do not have
the appropriate autonomy and resources to do so. Rather, they push to increase attendance
by enticing parents through boutique programs, pre-K classes, social services and advertising
efforts. While some of these programs could very well improve the overall well being of the
community, it appears that principals would prefer to take additional steps to improve the
quality of their schools that would require increased autonomy. Although some recent schoollevel changes suggest that there may be tremors in the usual firmament, our investigation
suggests that the schools most affected by the exodus of students to charter schools continue to
be mired with dysfunction. As such, it seems unlikely that an effective response will come from
the school level anytime soon.
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Moving Forward: A District-Level Response?
As usual, change is afoot in the leadership of D.C. public schools. Since the bulk of
our research concluded in the spring of 2007, Mayor Adrian Fenty’s takeover of DCPS and
subsequent appointment of Chancellor Michelle Rhee represent a new chapter in the life of
D.C. education politics. Ms. Rhee’s lack of previous experience as a Superintendent made her
appointment controversial in some circles, but the D.C. Council approved her appointment
unanimously upon the completion of her confirmation hearing. While some contend that these
somewhat radical events are attributable to the effects of school choice, readers should keep in
mind two contending factors. First, several other urban districts such as New York and Chicago
have experienced mayoral takeovers in recent years in the absence of school choice competition.
Secondly, D.C. has hosted a series of non-traditional superintendents who predated the charter
explosion—Rhee’s appointment is not as revolutionary as one might think. For now, it is
difficult to defend any causal claims between school choice and these recent developments.
Yet other recent actions of Mayor Fenty and his staff are stronger indicators that the
competitive framework of school choice will be adhered to more strictly in the future. For
example, in order to meet his proposed $12.1 million in cuts to public school funding, Fenty’s
Fiscal Year 2008 Budget proposes to begin funding all public schools on estimated enrollments
for the coming year rather than audited enrollment from the previous year. This decision
clearly represents a “political will” to cut the budget in response to charter school growth.
Furthermore, he will no longer adhere to former Mayor Anthony Williams’ policy of reimbursing
District public schools for funds lost to the voucher program.
As for facilities maintenance, Fenty has committed $17 million this summer for renovations
at 33 schools and has obtained at least 40 donations from private businesses, each offering
$10,000 worth of repair services for DCPS schools.48 Fenty also showed his commitment
to facilities renovations in appointing Allen Lew, the chief executive of the D.C. Sports and
Entertainment Commission, to manage the district’s school modernization plan. And on
November 28, 2007, Mayor Fenty and Chancellor Rhee proposed to close 24 campuses by the

48 Theola Labbe. “Summer Break, But Plenty of Work: Fenty Aims to Repair Crumbling Facilities.” Washington
Post, July 1, 2007, C06.
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Summer of 2010 in an effort to align facilities space and costs with enrollment within the
school district.49
Turning to the competency of the administration, the Washington Post reported in
October of 2007 that the Mayor seeks to “amend city personnel rules to give (Chancellor
Rhee) the power to fire hundreds of employees in a planned restructuring of the system’s
central administration.” In addition to cleaning house upon receiving authority to conduct
the restructuring, the plan is designed to improve performance management within the
administration by moving administrators to an “at will” working status.
If these recent plans come to fruition and spark further reforms in line with the school
choice model, further examination of the behavioral response to charter school competition
will be required to determine the extent to which public schools compete. However, in spite of
this strong showing of a commitment to change, the lack of communication between Fenty and
the D.C. Council regarding a series of initiatives, most recently the plan to close 24 schools by
2010, hints towards the politics of old. 50 Only time will tell whether or not politics will wear
down the momentum of the mayor’s policy agenda, but for the time being it appears that Fenty
and his team are succeeding in their efforts to implement change. As Fenty and his staff take
their first steps, many residents of D.C. hope that the muzzled dog that has yet to bark might
begin to growl.

49 Theola Labbe. “Short Notice on Plan to Close Schools Angers Council.” Washington Post, November 29,
2007, B01.
50 David Nakamura and Nikita Stewart. “Fenty’s Mode On Schools Is Breeding Alienation.” Washington
Post, December 3, 2007, B01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/02/
AR2007120202058.html?hpid=moreheadlines
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